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THE SHADOW OF POLITICS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: AN 
ANALYSIS OF HOW THE ROME STATUTE INSULATES THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT FROM 
POLITICAL INFLUENCE 
PRELUDE TO THE ICC 
The quest for a permanent international criminal court began long before the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court adopted the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998.1 When the United Nations General 
Assembly approved the Genocide Convention in 1948, it charged the International Law Commission with 
the responsibility to carry out a study on the possibility and desirability of establishing an international 
judicial organ for the prosecution of, inter alia, the crime of genocide.2 …” It is understandable that a 
community such as the international community, in seeking a more structured organization, even if only 
an incipient 'institutionalization', should have turned in another direction, namely toward a system 
vesting in international institutions other than States the exclusive responsibility, first, for determining 
the existence of a breach of an obligation of basic importance to the international community as a 
whole, and thereafter, for deciding what measures should be taken in response and how they should be 
implemented.3 However, despite the so-called Nuremberg promise that the trials after the Second 
World War would set a precedent for others, it was not until 1994 that the ILC produced the final draft 
for the statute of an international court. 
The Rome conference was by no means a walk in the park. It took weeks of negotiations, cajoling and 
compromises for the parties to come up with a final statute. The most serious controversies surrounding 
the creation of the court were about its independence from political use and misuse; And especially with 
regards to the powers exercised over the court by the Security Council. The ILC draft in article 23 
envisioned a broad range of powers to the Security Council: 
a) The court would not be able to deal with matters of aggression before the council gave a 
determination that the state in question had committed the aggression which was the subject 
matter of the complaint. 
b) The council could refer matters to the court pursuant to chapter VII of the UN charter. 
c) The court could not, in the absence of council approval, commence a prosecution which was 
being dealt with by the council under its Chapter VII powers. 
                                                          
1 The first serious proposal for an international court was probably made in 1872 by Gustav Moynier, one of the 
founders of the International Committee of the Red Cross, who was concerned that national judges would not be 
able fairly to judge offences committed in wars in which their countries had been involved: Christopher Keith Hall, 
“The First Proposal for a Permanent International Criminal Court” (1998) 322 International Review of the Red Cross 
57.   
2 GA Res. 260(III) B. This study was to be undertaken by the ILC in parallel with its drafting of the substantive rules 
of international criminal law. 
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The above provisions, and others led to great criticism of the court as suggested because with the 
contemplated measures true independence from political maneuvering would be nothing more than an 
aspiration. The final statute reflected all these concerns as well as the importance of the Security Council 
in maintaining international peace and security.  
It is undoubted that for the ICC to achieve its key objectives and to “guarantee lasting respect for and 
the enforcement of international justice”4, it must not be or be perceived as a tool for hegemonic states. 
To this end, in its structure and organization as well as in the conduct of its duties under the statute 
every care must be taken to ensure that political considerations do not cloud the independence of the 
court. Only if the judges are independent will the court be able to carry out its functions of 
administering justice properly. This is recognized by the “Basic Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary”, which the UNGA endorsed in 1985 
The following essay attempts to analyze the provisions of the Rome statute which secure the ICC’s 
independence and how successful these attempts are. The statute contains 13 distinct parts preceded 
by a preamble outlining why the state parties thought it necessary to establish the court. In this essay I 
will make an attempt to first point out the provisions that do secure independence followed by those 
that hamper this goal. I will thereafter wind up with a conclusion as to whether the court is truly 
independent or not. 
THE ROME STATUTE 
The preamble provides “…Determined to these ends and for the sake of present and future generations, 
to establish an independent permanent International Criminal Court in relationship with the United 
Nations system, with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole…” These words attest to the importance of independence in the court’s exercise 
of jurisdiction if the spirit and object of the statute are to be adhered to. 
Over the years there have been several international criminal tribunals: notably the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, the ICTY and the ICTR. These tribunals were temporary, and established to carry out very 
specific functions as limited by the terms of reference in their respective statutes. Nuremberg was 
criticized for epitomizing “victors justice”, while the ICTR and the ICTY were created under Security 
Council resolutions which essentially means that the council was responsible for deciding how much 
power, and how much independence, if any, the tribunals would exercise. These and other criticisms 
gave impetus to the move for a permanent court of justice that would have jurisdiction over the most 
serious crimes that shock the conscience of humanity. The fact the court is Permanent is likely to 
increase independence of its functions because there is no fear of its disbandment depending upon 
prevailing political whims. 
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PROVISIONS THAT GUARANTEE INDEPENDENCE 
Article 1 provides “…and shall be complementary to national jurisdictions…” Articles 17-19 set out 
matters to be considered in determining admissibility of a case. Therefore the ICC’s jurisdiction is 
narrow; cases can only proceed in circumstances when a national court cannot do the job. Whether a 
national court is unable to or unwilling to legitimately proceed is not within the sole discretion of the 
Prosecutor  
Article 2 provides that the court shall be brought into relationship with the UN through an agreement to 
be concluded by the president of the court with the approval of the Assembly of States. The ILC itself 
acknowledged that such a relationship ought not to affect the independence of the court; “a close 
relationship between the court and the United Nations was considered essential and a necessary link to 
the universality and standing of the court, though such a relationship should in no way jeopardize the 
independence of the court.”5 Had the ICC been established through the UN either as a subsidiary organ 
of the GA under article 226, or by the Security Council in the exercise of its delegation powers under 
article 297 or under its chapter VII powers it would not be unrealistic to foresee a situation where such a 
subsidiary organ would face the risk of political intrusion in the performance of its duties. 
Articles 5-8 define the crimes that will fall within the jurisdiction of the court. Article 5 is emphatic that 
the court’s jurisdiction shall be limited to “the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole”. This takes out of play purely political squabbles between states. Thus, it is 
unlikely that states or even individuals could use the court as a weapon in any infraction of a purely 
political nature. The article also puts the crime of aggression squarely within the jurisdiction of the court 
without requiring SC determination of the matter prior to this8. Had this proposal, with the USA as its 
chief campaigner, passed, then an element of politics would have entered the judicial sphere through 
politicized SC referrals. 
Further to this, the high definitional threshold that must be proved for each of the crimes necessarily 
implies that a purely political agenda disguised as a genuine international crime will not pass judicial 
scrutiny. For instance: 
a) The special intent for genocide in article 6 calls for “intent to destroy, in whole or in part…”  
                                                          
5 1996 report of the Preparatory committee. 
6 “The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its 
functions” 
7 “The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its 
functions” 
8 Article 23 of the 1994 ILC draft provided inter alia, “the prior determination by the Security Council under Article 
39 of the Charter of an act of aggression by a state, as a prerequisite for a complaint to be brought before the 
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b) Article 7 requires that crimes against humanity be committed as part of a “widespread or 
systematic attack…” 
c) Article 8 provides that war crimes will be within the purview of the court only “when committed 
as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission…” 
Before any individual can be held criminally responsible under the statute the above must be proved. 
This reinforces the argument that it is improbable for the court to carry out purely political prosecutions. 
Article 14 provides that state parties may refer a “situation” for investigation. By using the word 
situation rather than states or individuals or other such terms, the risk of political references is further 
curtailed. This is so because the state merely refers a situation, while the power to carry out 
investigations and to determine who to be prosecuted is reserved to the prosecutor and the court. 
Article 15 provides for a proprio motu prosecutor who may initiate investigations on his own motion. 
This was one of the most contentious issues during the negotiation process. Countries such as the USA 
were worried about the possibility of a prosecutor who would carry out a politically motivated 
prosecution on behalf of antagonist states and would not be subject to the oversight which national 
authorities have over their own prosecutors. These fears should have been allayed by provisions of the 
statute which guarantee prosecutorial independence. Various procedures for investigation and 
prosecution ensure that the case is a proper one in terms of evidence, and jurisdiction, and that national 
courts are not genuinely handling the case. These have the effect of restricting the prosecutor’s 
authority, while not infringing on his independence.9 For instance Article 15(3) requires the 
authorization of the pre-trial chamber before investigations can be proceeded with.  
Article 27 provides that the statute applies equally to all persons without any distinction based on 
official capacity. This means that even sitting heads of state can be held responsible for violations of 
international criminal law. Omar-al-Bashir is the first sitting head of state to be indicted by the ICC, 
which has charged him with five counts of crimes against humanity and two counts of war crimes. By 
giving the court such broad judicial powers, it is evident that the court can remain truthful to its cause. 
No political considerations can hamper the exercise of jurisdiction over persons who meet the criteria 
set out in the statute. No matter how powerful the suspect in question, justice can and will run its 
course unimpeded.  
Article 40 provides that the judges shall be independent in the performance of their functions and shall 
not engage in any activity which is likely to interfere with their judicial functions or to affect confidence 
in their independence.  
                                                          
9 Allison Marston Banner, ‘Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the 
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Article 41 provides that judges should not participate in any case where their impartiality has been 
compromised. It goes on to give the prosecutor or the person being investigated power to request 
disqualification of a judge. 
It is interesting to note the British sentiments on justice after the Nuremberg trials, “The question of the 
fate of the Nazi leaders is a political, and not a judicial question it would not rest with judges, however 
eminent or learned, to decide finally a matter like this, which is of the widest and most vital public 
policy.”10  Nothing best shows the flawed Nuremberg than this assertion. As argued by critics, 
Nuremberg was a victors’ tribunal, set up to try the leaders of a defeated power. Perhaps this keen 
awareness led the makers of the ICC to include articles 40 and 41 with the hopes that the judges chosen 
will be of sufficient character and integrity to refuse to bow to political pressure. 
Article 42 goes on to require the office of the prosecutor to act independently as a separate organ of the 
court. By giving the prosecutor proprio motu powers his independence is assured because he can 
commence investigations without having to kowtow to Security Council whims. 
Article 48 provides privileges and immunities to the judges, the prosecutor, his deputy and the registrar 
in the exercise of their duties. This is one of the most important independence guaranteeing provisions 
because it ensures that the individuals can carry out their tasks without fear of reprisals. 
Provisions that Hamper Independence of the Court 
Article 16 gives the Security Council power to defer investigations or prosecutions for a period of 
12months subject to renewal. This technically means that the council can defer matters before the court 
indefinitely. Regrettably, this is an open invitation to the SC to affect and even dominate the 
proceedings. The adoption by the SC of resolutions suspending non-existent proceedings in 2002 and 
2003 at the behest of the previous US administration was one such controversial use of article 16.11 
Article 36 provides that judges shall be elected from a list of nominees made by state parties to the 
Rome statute. The judges shall be elected by secret ballot at a meeting of the Assembly of State Parties 
convened for that purpose under article 112. Judges therefore are to be chosen by politicians and 
diplomats, which brings a political element into the appointments system. 
Article 98 precludes the court from asking for the surrender of a suspect if that would require the 
requested state to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to 
which the consent of a sending state is required to surrender a person of the state to the court. The US 
                                                          
10 Quoted in G. Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice, at 
212 (2000 
11 Aly Mokhtar, “The fine art of arm-twisting: The US, resolution 1422 and the Security Council deferral power 
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has been the key user of these so called Article 98 agreements which have the impact of diminishing the 
courts independence to carry out impartial prosecutions. 
Articles 103-111 provide the procedure through which court decisions will be enforced. It is surprising 
that the ICC was not given stronger powers of enforcement. To be sure, state parties have a legal duty of 
cooperation under article 86, but states often slack on this sort of duty, and rhetoric is a limited goad. 
One might wish that there was more attention in Rome to the necessary convergence between the ICC 
and the SC council for effective enforcement of the court’s orders.12  
Articles 115-116 of the statute provides that the expenses of the court shall be provided from assessed 
contributions of the state parties, funds provided by the UN, as well as voluntary contributions. For any 
judicial institution, the mode of financing is of high importance for the independence of that institution. 
Politicians may be tempted to exercise influence on the judicial system by not allocating sufficient 
money to the judiciary. Perhaps, a provision should have been put in place to require the SC to provide 
financing whenever it refers a matter to the matter to the court. The experience of enforcing the Omar-
al-Bashir warrant clearly shows the handicaps the court has in terms of funds to execute its rulings. 
CONCLUSION 
Twelve years after the Rome statute entered into force, the ICC has become one of the most important 
international institutions. As at May 2013, 122 countries are state parties to the statute of the court. The 
prosecutor had received over 8874 communications as at September 2010, and has opened 
investigations into 7 countries in Africa.13 Because of the nature of the crimes within the ICC’s 
jurisdiction - genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression - which are often committed 
with some political objective in mind, it is undoubted that every decision of the ICC will have political 
overtones. 
In drafting the statute it was necessary to avoid “weakening the Statute to the point where the Court 
would be constantly paralyzed” and not worth having.14 As Judge Kirsch stated: “Thus the balancing 
sought in Rome was to create a Statute strong enough to ensure the effective functioning of the Court, 
with sufficient safeguards to foster broad support among States”.15 
In addition to the provisions already discussed, other examples of safeguards incorporated into the 
Rome Statute to alleviate States’ concerns include: 
a) Provisions on election and qualifications of prosecutors and judges;  
                                                          
12 Ruth Wedgewood, “The International Criminal Court: An American View” (1999) EJIL 
13 International Criminal Court, September 2010, Communications, Referrals and Preliminary Examinations 
14 Philippe Kirsch QC and Darryl Robinson “Reaching Agreement at the Rome Conference (2002: Oxford University 
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b) Provisions for removal of officials for serious misconduct or breach of duty;  
c) Incorporation of the fair trial provisions;  
d) Specific protection for national security information.  
On balance, it appears that the measures put in place make it very unlikely that the court has ended up 
being enslaved by the political machinations of hegemonic states. The fraught relationship between the 
SC and the court is both the problem and the solution to the independence question. Only time will tell 
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